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Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible
Mutual Funds?
ARNO RIEDL and PAUL SMEETS∗
ABSTRACT
To understand why investors hold socially responsible mutual funds, we link ad-
ministrative data to survey responses and behavior in incentivized experiments. We
find that both social preferences and social signaling explain socially responsible in-
vestment (SRI) decisions. Financial motives play less of a role. Socially responsible
investors in our sample expect to earn lower returns on SRI funds than on con-
ventional funds and pay higher management fees. This suggests that investors are
willing to forgo financial performance in order to invest in accordance with their social
preferences.
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS (SRIs) are increasing in economic and fi-
nancial importance, as testified by their growing volume in Europe and the
United States (EUROSIF (2014), Social Investment Forum (SIF, 2014)). In
the United States, for instance, already one in nine dollars of professionally
managed assets are involved in SRI. These investments are a puzzle in fi-
nance, however, because they deviate from the market by excluding potentially
high-return “sin” companies from their portfolio or by focusing on companies
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that have high scores with respect to environment, human rights, employee
relations, and so forth (SIF (2014)).
Why do investors hold socially responsible mutual funds? While it is tempting
to conclude that strong prosocial preferences drive this decision, other motives
are also possible. On the financial side, investors may have optimistic risk-
return expectations for SRI or a desire to diversify their portfolio risk. Another
possible motive could be that investors hold SRI to boost their social image or
reputation.
The theoretical and empirical evidence regarding these possible explana-
tions is inconclusive. With respect to social preferences, some theoretical mod-
els assume that investors may be willing to pay a premium to invest in so-
cially responsible companies (e.g., Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001), Gollier
and Pouget (2014)). Other recent theoretical contributions imply that holdings
of SRI funds do not necessarily reflect social preferences (Dufwenberg et al.
(2011), Sobel (2015)). Direct empirical evidence on the role of social preferences
in SRI is missing.
A few empirical studies show that SRI equity may perform financially better
(or not worse) than conventional investments.1 Other studies, however, find
that investing in a socially responsible manner is financially costly.2 Thus, it is
impossible to deduce from prior literature whether investors hold SRI equity
funds because they expect these funds to outperform conventional equity funds;
there exists little direct empirical evidence on whether investors expect SRI
funds to perform better than conventional funds (Nilsson (2008), Bauer and
Smeets (2015)).
Regarding reputation motives, several theoretical and experimental papers
emphasize the importance of creating a positive social image via social signal-
ing.3 Investors could achieve such a positive image, for instance, by talking to
others about their SRI. As far as we know, however, no study explores social
reputation as a possible motive for SRI.
In this paper, we shed light on why investors hold socially responsible mu-
tual funds by combining administrative investor data, behavior in incentivized
experiments, and survey data. Specifically, we first obtain administrative data
from a large mutual fund provider that offers a wide variety of socially respon-
sible and conventional mutual funds. Individual investors buy and sell their
funds directly online without the interference of an intermediary. We then
1 See, for instance, Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten (2005), Derwall et al. (2005), Kempf and Osthoff
(2007), and Edmans (2011). Moreover, Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) find that the losses of
firms that violate environmental regulations are equal to the legislation costs but that firms face
no additional costs due to reputation loss.
2 For instance, Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant (2008) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that
divesting from sin industries that involve weapons, tobacco, alcohol, or gambling is costly because
these companies tend to perform better than “nonsin” companies. Moreover, Krüger (2015) finds
that stock prices sometimes react negatively to positive corporate social responsibility (CSR) news.
3 Theoretical contributions include Glazer and Konrad (1996), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), and
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). Empirical evidence is provided by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier
(2009), Fehrler and Przepiorka (2013), and Cappelen et al. (2017).
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merge these data with results from a survey and incentivized experiments
that we conducted using a large group of individual investors. We thus create
a unique data set that links the administrative data of conventional and so-
cially responsible investors to their behavior in controlled experiments and to
answers in a comprehensive survey.
To investigate the potential effects of social preferences on portfolio choice,
it is necessary to have a clean and independent measure of such preferences.
This measure should ideally be unaffected by strategic reputation considera-
tions (Kreps et al. (1982)) or social image concerns (Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008)). To obtain such a measure, we let investors participate in a controlled
and anonymous one-shot trust game experiment (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(1995)). The trust game is a two-player sequential move game where the first
mover can transfer money to the second mover. The transferred amount is
tripled by the experimenter. The second mover can send back to the first mover
all, parts, or none of the money received. The behavior of the first mover mainly
captures trust, which is why the game is called a trust game. However, we want
to capture social preferences rather than trust. We therefore use the behavior
of investors in the role of second movers to measure intrinsic social preferences
(Karlan (2005), Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2013)). A second mover who behaves
like the prototypical homo economicus should not send back any money. The
more an investor in the role of second mover returns, the stronger are the
investor’s intrinsic social preferences.
We find that intrinsic social preferences play an important role in deter-
mining SRI. An investor who equally shares the money in the experiment is
14 percentage points more likely to hold an SRI equity fund compared to a self-
ish investor who keeps all the money. This effect is economically substantial as
only 16% of our total sample holds an SRI equity fund. We also find that social
signaling motivates investors’ SRI equity holdings; investors who talk more
often about their investments are more likely to invest in a socially responsible
way. Moreover, socially responsible investors donate about 41% more to charity
than conventional investors, implying that SRI is not a substitute for charity
donations.
Financial motives also play a role in whether investors hold SRI. On the one
hand, we find that investors are willing to pay significantly higher management
fees on SRI funds than on conventional funds and a majority of investors expect
SRI funds to underperform relative to conventional funds. On the other hand,
we find that investors who expect SRI equity funds to underperform relative
to conventional equity funds are less likely to invest in a socially responsible
manner. Hence, our evidence indicates that some investors are willing to forgo
financial performance in order to invest in mutual funds that are in concor-
dance with their social preferences, but at the margin pessimistic performance
expectations reduce the likelihood of investing in a socially responsible way.
Investors who expect SRI equity funds to perform financially better than con-
ventional equity funds are not more likely to hold such funds.
Risk perceptions are unrelated to holdings of SRI funds. However, investors
who generally hold funds longer are more likely to invest in SRI equity funds,
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which indicates that socially responsible investors have a longer investment
horizon. We also find that investors with larger portfolios are more likely to
hold SRI, perhaps for risk diversification reasons.4 Individual socioeconomic
characteristics only play a marginal role in determining whether investors
hold SRI equity funds.
Overall, we identify a number of factors that influence individuals’ decisions
to invest in a socially responsible manner. Our most robust and strongest result
is that intrinsic social preferences play a dominant role, even when controlling
for risk preferences, trading activity, realized Sharpe ratios, and other investor
characteristics.
Interestingly, when we look only at investors who hold an SRI equity fund in
their portfolio, we do not find a significant relation between social preferences
and the percentage invested in SRI equity funds. This suggests that strong so-
cial preferences are needed to buy an SRI fund in the first place, but that they
are less important for choosing the fraction of the portfolio to allocate to SRI
funds once this first hurdle has been overcome. However, in line with the social
signaling hypothesis, we find that investors with weak social preferences who
strongly signal their investment behavior hold significantly smaller shares in
SRI. This suggests that relatively selfish investors who hold SRI for signal-
ing reasons minimize the percentage of SRI they hold. In addition, we find
that financial motives affect the fraction invested in SRI funds. In particular,
investors with a larger portfolio invest a smaller fraction in SRI funds, most
likely to diversify their portfolio.
Our empirical results are related to several theoretical models. In their sem-
inal work, Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) develop a model in which some
investors refrain from investing in nonresponsible companies. These investors
drive up the price and lower the expected returns of socially responsible com-
panies, because the risk of nonresponsible firms is borne by fewer investors.
Similarly, Fama and French (2007) show that taste for assets can influence
stock prices. Gollier and Pouget (2014) develop a model in which investors can
improve the social responsibility of firms by excluding nonresponsible com-
panies from their portfolio or by activism against nonresponsible firms.5 Our
paper provides empirical support for a key assumption of these models: social
preferences are indeed an important determinant of investment decisions.
Some previous empirical studies show that socially responsible investors may
behave differently from conventional investors. Bollen (2007) and Renneboog,
Ter Horst, and Zhang (2011) find that, ex post, investors are more likely to hold
on to badly performing SRI funds than to poorly performing conventional funds.
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) report that, in comparison to Republican fund
4 An anonymous referee pointed out that wealthy investors might hold SRI for social capital
reasons. We cannot exclude this possibility as our data do not lend themselves to investigating this
hypothesis.
5 De Bettignies and Robinson (2015) develop a model that examines whether CSR is beneficial
for society. Baron (2007) models socially responsible firm behavior as donations. He shows that the
cost of social responsibility is borne by the social entrepreneur when going public rather than by
the shareholder as long as CSR is anticipated by shareholders.
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managers, Democratic fund managers select stocks that score higher on social
responsibility.6 Importantly, these studies do not distinguish between whether
socially responsible investors hold different beliefs regarding the performance
of SRI funds, are motivated by social reputation concerns, or are motivated
by intrinsic social preferences. Another important difference with Hong and
Kostovetsky is that investors in our study make decisions for their own account
instead of on behalf of others. This difference is important, as Andersson et al.
(2013) show that decisions made for others can differ vastly from decisions
made for oneself.
Understanding investors’ reasons for holding SRI funds is important be-
cause, as Fama and French (2007) show, taste for assets can have long-run
effects on asset prices, whereas differences in beliefs have only short-run ef-
fects (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2010), Borgers et al. (2013)). We find little
evidence for the beliefs hypothesis. Rather, social preferences and—to some
extent—social signaling are important for SRI decisions. The effect of social
preferences is likely to be particularly long lasting, as SRI has been steadily
rising in recent years. As SRI continues to grow,7 socially responsible investors
might have even more of an effect on asset prices by driving up prices of socially
responsible companies and driving down prices of sin companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the
data, Section II describes the variables, and Section III discusses individual-
and portfolio-level investor characteristics. Section IV presents our main anal-
ysis of investors’ motives for holding SRI equity funds. Section V examines
investor characteristics related to their social preferences and social signaling,
and Section VI explores the relationship between SRI and charitable donations.
Section VII concludes, discusses questions left open by our study, and suggests
some avenues for future research on SRI.
I. Data
In this section, we first describe the administrative investor data. Next we
give a description of the survey data. Finally, we provide details on the incen-
tivized experiments.
A. Administrative Investor Data
We use administrative individual investor data from one of the largest mu-
tual fund providers in the Netherlands. The data cover the period June 2006 to
6 Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) also demonstrate that companies run by a Democratic-leaning
CEO are more likely to go green than firms run by a Republican-leaning CEO. Other papers
investigating SRI decisions include Statman (2004), Nilsson (2008), Hood, Nofsinger, and Varma
(2014), and Bauer and Smeets (2015).
7 Previous studies show that mutual funds that advertise observe larger inflows of money into
these funds (e.g., Jain and Wu (2000), Cronqvist (2006)). The growing interest in SRI could make
it more attractive for mutual funds to advertise these funds in the near future, further increasing
the market share of SRI.
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June 2012. The mutual fund provider offers a wide range of investment funds,
including equity funds, bond funds, and mixed funds. Within these categories,
funds can be global, sector-specific, SRI, and more.8 The administrative data
for each investor contain all monthly fund holdings, including SRI funds.9 We
define as socially responsible investors that hold at least one SRI equity fund
in their portfolio.
B. Survey Data
The survey and experiments were conducted in June 2011. The adminis-
trative data provide information on 3,382 socially responsible investors, all
of whom were invited to participate in the survey. In addition to the socially
responsible investors, we randomly selected 35,000 investors of the approxi-
mately 145,000 remaining accounts in the database.10 We sent an email con-
taining a link to the online survey to all selected investors. The response
rate was 8% for conventional investors and 12% for socially responsible in-
vestors. We deliberately invited disproportionately more socially responsible
investors to increase statistical power when comparing them to conventional
investors. Relative to the invited sample, respondents are slightly more likely
to be male and older, and to hold larger portfolios (see Table A.1 in the
Appendix for a comparison of the survey respondents and the overall sam-
ple regarding gender, age, total portfolio value, and the percentage of SRI
equity holdings). We control for these and other demographic variables in our
analyses.
In the online survey, investors answered questions and took part in exper-
iments with monetary incentives (see below for details). At the beginning of
the survey, respondents received some general information and were informed
that they would take part in several experiments, but they were not informed
about the content of the experiments until the experiments actually took place.
The introduction to the survey also explained the general procedure regarding
possible monetary earnings in the experiments. In the first part of the survey,
we asked general investment questions such as assets held, the number of
8 Figure IA1 in the Internet Appendix, available in the online version of the article on the Journal
of Finance website, shows a screenshot of the product selector of the mutual fund provider. The
product selector shows for each fund the category to which it belongs and whether the provider
classifies the fund as sustainable, emerging market, global, etc. On the same screen, investors can
read details about the fund, including stock selections based on social responsibility criteria. In
addition, the product selector gives information such as past performance, Morningstar ratings,
and fees.
9 Our survey (see below) indicates that 83% of all investors (including those who do not hold
SRI funds) respond positively or neutrally to the statement that SRI have a positive influence on
society. Only 26% of respondents indicate in another statement that they believe SRI funds are a
marketing trick to sell more funds. We are therefore confident that funds defined as SRI funds are
perceived as such by most investors.
10 We excluded investors who no longer held the account at the time we conducted the sur-
vey. We also did not invite investors who never placed a single trade or who were younger
than 18.
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investment accounts, and investment goals. In this part investors also partic-
ipated in an experiment designed to elicit risk preferences. More questions on
investment behavior then followed. Toward the middle of the survey, investors
participated in an experiment eliciting their intrinsic social preferences. We
asked all survey questions regarding SRI and other behavior that could be
interpreted as related to social goals after the experiments concluded.
Survey questions have some known limitations. For instance, respondents
might differ from nonrespondents and respondents’ answers may depend upon
how the questions are framed. We discuss a potential response bias in our
results below and conclude that if a response bias is present, it likely weak-
ens the effects we identify and we thus err on the conservative side. Re-
garding framing effects, it is important to note that all investors received
the same questions. Because we are primarily interested in potential differ-
ences in beliefs and attitudes between socially responsible and conventional
investors, any framing effects should be similar for these groups. Surveys
also have major benefits. Specifically important for our purposes, a survey
allows us to gather information about return expectations on and risk percep-
tions of SRI in comparison to conventional equity investments, information
that would otherwise remain unobserved. Moreover, we can collect informa-
tion on other important control variables like self-rated investment knowl-
edge, income level, education, etc. See Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013)
for further discussion of the pros and cons of surveys for studying financial
decisions.
C. Incentivized Experiments11
Investors participated in a risk preferences elicitation experiment as well as
in an interactive experiment with other investors where we elicited their so-
cial preferences. All experiments were incentivized with real money. Investors
were informed that their earnings depended on their own decisions and (in
some cases) on the decisions of other investors. They were also informed that
whether they would receive the earnings from the experiment would be deter-
mined randomly (with a chance of 1 in 10) at the end of the survey.12 Those
who were selected for payment got one of the experiments paid out at ran-
dom. Investors received their earnings via bank transfer the first working
day after they completed the survey, and the payments were guaranteed by
the authors’ university. We used a unique identification number to link the
choices in the experiments and survey answers to our administrative data.
To ensure anonymity of investors, we hired an external company that spe-
cializes in conducting online research to handle the payments. This company
does not have access to the trading records or other information of the in-
vestors. Survey participants were informed about this at the beginning of the
survey.
11 The experiment instructions can be found in Section I in the Internet Appendix.
12 For a recent validation of this procedure, see Dohmen et al. (2011).
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C.1. Risk Preferences
We elicited risk preferences using incentivized multiple price list lotteries,
similar to Dohmen et al. (2011) (see also Holt and Laury (2002)). Investors
faced 20 decision situations in which they had to choose between a specific
sure amount and a lottery with a 50% chance of winning 300 euro and a
50% chance of not winning anything. The sure amount was minimally 0 euro
and maximally 190 euro and increased in steps of 10 euro from one decision
situation to the next. The choice options presented are reported in Table A.2
in the Appendix. Participants made decisions in all 20 decision situations. For
incentive compatibility reasons, and in accordance with the literature on risk
elicitation experiments, only one of these 20 situations was randomly selected
to be paid out.
The decision situation in which participants switch between the lottery and
the certain outcome informs us about their risk preferences. We therefore use
this switching point as a measure of an individual’s risk attitude. As the sure
amount is ordered from low to high, a higher switching point from the lottery
to the sure amount indicates a greater degree of risk tolerance.
C.2. Social Preferences
To measure intrinsic social preferences, we use a variant of the trust game
experiment introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). The trust game
is a two-player sequential game. Both the first mover and the second mover
are endowed with 50 euro.13 The first mover decides on the amount to send to
the second mover, which can be any multiple of 5 euro, including 0 and 50. The
amount sent is tripled by the experimenter and the second mover decides how
much of the money received to return to the first mover. Hence, the earnings of
the first mover are 50 euro minus the amount sent plus the amount returned
by the second mover. The earnings of the second mover are 50 euro plus triple
the amount sent by the first mover minus the money sent back.14
We use second mover behavior to measure intrinsic social preferences.15 To
obtain a comprehensive measure of intrinsic social preferences as well as for
practical implementation reasons, we employ the so-called strategy method
(Selten (1967)), whereby each second mover decides how much to send back
for each of the 10 possible nonzero amounts sent by the first mover (ranging
13 Since its introduction by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), it is standard practice in the
literature using trust game experiments to endow both participants with the same initial amount
(e.g., Fehr and List (2004), Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2013), Falk and Zehnder (2013)). The main
reason is to avoid experimenter-induced unequal positions ex ante.
14 The money sent by the first mover and tripling of this amount by the experimenters is “free
lunch” for the second mover. One may argue that second movers could act differently if they needed
to earn these benefits. Unfortunately, there is no evidence available on how second mover behavior
in trust games would change if first mover transfers and tripling of the transfer were not free. We
therefore adopt the standard procedure.
15 We also have data on the behavior of first movers in the trust game, but we do not report them
here for brevity and because these data intermingle trust and social preferences (Cox (2004)).
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from 5 euro to 50 euro) before knowing the actual amount sent. Specifically, the
experiment instructions inform second movers that “[f]or technical reasons you
should make your decision without knowing how much money the person to
whom you have been linked has actually sent you. Therefore, for each possible
amount that the other person could send you, we would like to ask you to
indicate how much you would like to return. However, only the decision that is
relevant for the amount that has actually been sent is decisive for your income
and the income of the person to whom you have been linked.”
In addition to generating a comprehensive measure of intrinsic social prefer-
ences, another important advantage of the strategy method is that it simulates
sequential moves for each possible choice of the first mover without deceiv-
ing subjects and without requiring that players’ choices indeed be sequen-
tial over time. Similar versions of the strategy method have been successfully
used in recent trust game experiments (see, for example, Baran, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2010), Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2013), and Falk and Zehnder
(2013)).
Each investor was either a first mover or a second mover. Every work day,
we randomly matched first movers to second movers. After choices were made,
we implemented the one choice out of the 10 possible choices of the second
mover that corresponded to the actual choice of the first mover, if the first
mover made a nonzero transfer. For example, if the first mover transferred
30 euro to the second mover, we used the amount that the second mover
wanted to return for that transfer to calculate earnings. In the example, the
second mover would receive 3 × 30 = 90 euro from the first mover. If the sec-
ond mover decided to return, say, 45 euro, the earnings of the second mover
would be 90 − 45 + 50 (endowment) = 95 euro and the earnings of the first
mover would be –30 + 45 + 50 (endowment) = 65 euro. If the choice of the
first mover was to send zero, both movers earned their initial endowment of
50 euro.
Second movers in the trust game are randomly assigned to one of two
conditions. Under one condition, they are matched to a first mover who
is a randomly chosen investor participating in the survey and the experi-
ment. Under the other condition, a second mover is randomly matched to a
first mover who is a socially responsible investor participating in the sur-
vey and the experiment. We inform subjects in the introduction to the ex-
periment about the condition to which they belong without telling them that
there are two different conditions.16 Investors received experiment instruc-
tions online and had to answer a couple of comprehension questions about
the rules of the game and how the payment is calculated before the ex-
periment started. These questions were correctly answered by 89.5% of the
investors.17
16 We do not find differences in behavior between conditions and therefore use the pooled data
in our analysis below.
17 We conduct our main analysis using all investors. In robustness analyses reported in the
Appendix, we confirm that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when excluding investors
who answered at least one question incorrectly after three trials (see Table A.6).
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The trust game was played only once. The investors were informed about
this and also about the fact that they and the other participants in the experi-
ment would remain anonymous during and after the experiment. The fact that
the trust game is played only once rules out repeated-game effects. Moreover,
the fact that second movers know that their behavior will never be revealed
to anybody and is known only anonymously to the experimenters, minimizes
prosocial behavior in the trust game that is due to reputation and social image
effects. We are therefore confident that we can interpret second mover behavior
as a clean measure of intrinsic social preferences. In Section II.C.2, we discuss
how we quantify this measure in more detail.
Before we move on, we comment on the stake sizes used in the experiment, as
they may seem small relative to investors’ assets and incomes. We are confident
that the stake sizes do not jeopardize our results for the following reasons. First,
as the most important effect of no or low stakes is an increase in the amount
of noise in the data (Camerer and Hogarth (1999)), too low stakes would likely
reduce our ability to detect a relation between social preferences identified in
our experiment and SRIs in the field. Therefore, if anything, the stake sizes we
employ are likely to err on the conservative side. Second, the payoffs in our ex-
periment can be considered reasonable given the time investors actually spent
on the experiment. On average it took participants 45 minutes to complete the
survey and all experiments. Therefore, the potential payment probably was
not too far off from participants’ opportunity costs, especially when considering
that investors likely participated in their leisure time. Third, although quanti-
tatively moderate stake size effects have been reported in experiments similar
to ours, qualitatively these effects do not differ much across low and high stakes
(Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Van De Kuilen (2004)).18
II. Variables
All variables discussed here are summarized in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
Table A.4 in the Appendix reports summary statistics for all variables and
results of statistical tests comparing socially responsible and conventional in-
vestors. Below we discuss in turn the variables from (A) the administrative
transaction data, (B) the survey questions, and (C) the experiments.
A. Administrative Variables
A.1. SRI Equity Fund Holdings
As mentioned above, we classify investors as socially responsible if they
own at least one SRI equity fund at the time of the experiment. We construct
Percentage in SRI equity funds, as the average amount invested in SRI equity
funds in the year after the experiment as a percentage of the total amount
invested in equity funds over the same period.
18 For a discussion of stake size effects, see also Falk and Heckman (2009).
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A.2. Other Portfolio Characteristics
We construct Log total portfolio value as the logarithm of the average euro
amount invested in bonds and equity at the provider in the year before the
survey and experiment, and Log number of transactions as the logarithm of
the number of trades an investor made in the 12 months prior to the exper-
iment. The variable Average holding period specifies the average number of
months an investor has held a mutual fund over the period June 2006 to
June 2011.
We calculate Mean portfolio returns as the average portfolio return in the year
before the investor participated in the survey and experiment and Volatility
portfolio returns as the monthly portfolio volatility over the same period. The
Sharpe ratio is equal to Mean portfolio returns divided by Volatility portfolio
returns in the year before the experiment.
B. Survey Variables
B.1. Return Expectations and Risk Perceptions
To explore the importance of financial motives, we elicit return expectations
and risk perceptions regarding SRI equity funds compared to conventional eq-
uity funds. To capture investors’ expected returns, we use responses to the
statement “I expect that the returns of socially responsible equity funds com-
pared to conventional equity funds are: Much lower, A bit lower, The same, A
bit higher, Much higher, I do not know.” Only 2.5% of the socially responsible
investors and 10.2% of the conventional investors chose “I do not know.” For our
regression models, to be introduced below, we create two dummy variables from
these responses. The dummy variable Lower expected returns on SRI takes a
value of one if the investor expects returns on SRI funds to be much lower or
a bit lower than returns on conventional equity funds and zero otherwise. The
dummy variable Higher expected returns on SRI takes a value of one if the
investor expects much higher or a bit higher returns on SRI funds compared to
conventional equity funds and zero otherwise. Equal return expectations form
the base category.
To measure risk perceptions of SRI equity funds compared to conventional
equity funds, we asked investors to rate their agreement with the statement
“Socially responsible equity funds are more risky than conventional equity
funds.” Responses to these statements had to be rated on a 7-point Likert scale,
from 1 “Disagree completely” to 7 “Agree completely.” We create the two dummy
variables from these responses. The variable Lower perceived risk on SRI takes
a value of one if the investor perceives the risk of SRI equity funds to be lower
than that of conventional equity funds (Likert scale 1 to 3) and zero otherwise,
while the dummy variable Higher perceived risk on SRI takes a value of one if
the investor perceives the risk of SRI equity funds to be higher than the risk
of conventional equity funds (Likert scale 5 to 7) and zero otherwise. Equally
perceived risk perceptions (Likert scale 4) form the base category.
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B.2. Signaling
Investors buy and sell funds at the mutual fund provider directly online
without the interference of an intermediary. Therefore, in principle, nobody
observes an investor’s portfolio. As a result, investors who want to signal to
others that they invest in SRI funds have to talk about their investments
with others. To capture the extent to which investors may use SRI funds to
signal prosocial investment activity, we asked investors for their agreement
with the statement “I often talk about investments with others,” again on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from “fully disagree” (Likert scale 1) to “fully agree”
(Likert scale 7). The question is phrased in neutral terms to avoid experimenter
demand effects as well as socially desirable responses. The answers to the
statement are coded by the variable Signaling. The variable Strong signaling
is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for investors who score
greater than or equal to the median value of Signaling and zero otherwise.
B.3. Investment Knowledge, SRI Perception, Education Level, and Other
Investor Characteristics
Similar to other studies (Dorn and Huberman (2005), Graham, Harvey,
and Huang (2009), Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011)), we measure self-
assessed Investment knowledge with the statement “My investment knowledge
is good.” Investors rated their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 “Fully
disagree” to 7 “Fully agree.”
We also elicited investors’ perception of the social impact of SRI by asking
them to report their agreement with the statement “SRI funds have a positive
influence on society” (1 = “Fully disagree” to 7 = “Fully agree”). The dummy
variable Perceived social impact is equal to one for investors who gave an
answer greater than or equal to the median answer and zero otherwise.
We also asked for investors’ highest-achieved education level. The dummy
variable University degree is equal to one if the investor indicated having a
university degree and zero otherwise.
Finally, we gathered information on investors’ gender, age, and income. The
dummy variable Female takes the value of one if the investor is a woman
and zero if the investor is a man. The variable Age is measured in years and
reflects an investor’s self-reported age in years. Investors also self-reported
their annual gross family income. We construct the dummy variables Low
income (below 60,000 euro), Median income (between 60,000 euro and 100,000
euro), and High income (above 100,000 euro) such that each category comprises
about one-third of the sample. The variable Untold income is equal to one for
investors who were unwilling to report their income and zero otherwise.
B.4. Donations
Charitable donations could substitute for or complement SRI. To test for
such a relation we asked investors how much they donate to charity each
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year on average. The variable Log donations specifies the logarithm of this
average.
C. Experiment Variables
C.1. Risk Preferences
The variable Risk preferences indicates the sure money amount at which the
investor switches from choosing the risky lottery to the risk-free option in the
risk preference elicitation experiment. A higher amount indicates greater risk
tolerance.
C.2. Intrinsic Social Preferences
We use second-mover behavior in our one-shot anonymous trust game ex-
periment to elicit intrinsic social preferences. Through the use of the strategy
method, we have 10 monetary return decisions for each investor in the role of
second mover. To capture intrinsic social preferences, we aggregate these re-
turn decisions and construct the natural measure “mean intrinsic social prefer-
ences.” Specifically, for each possible nonzero first-mover transfer (i.e., 5 euro,
10 euro, . . . , 50 euro), we calculate the ratio of the back-transfer and take the
average. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to this measure as Intrinsic
social preferences or just Social preferences, for brevity.
III. Individual and Portfolio Characteristics of Socially Responsible
and Conventional Investors
Table I shows that 16.2% of the investors in the sample can be classified
as socially responsible investors, that is, as investors who hold at least one
SRI equity fund. These investors hold on average 4,574 euro in SRI equity
funds, which corresponds to 23.0% of their total equity investments. Socially
responsible investors invest overwhelmingly in SRI equity funds (94.2%), as
compared to SRI bond funds (5.8%).
Regarding individual characteristics, we find that in comparison to conven-
tional investors socially responsible investors are more likely to hold a univer-
sity degree (59.0% versus 46.7%; X² test,19 p = 0.009), rate their investment
knowledge higher (4.3 versus 4.1; t-test, p = 0.029), and are marginally less
likely to be female (12.3% versus 18.7%; X² test, p = 0.064). With respect to
portfolio characteristics, the only substantial difference between the two sets
of investors is that socially responsible investors hold larger portfolios than
conventional investors (Log total portfolio value: 10.7 versus 10.3; t-test, p =
0.002).20
19 All tests are two-sided.
20 The interested reader can find the full set of comparisons of individual and portfolio charac-
teristics in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
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Table I
Portfolios of Socially Responsible Investors
This table provides details on the fund holdings of conventional investors and socially responsible
investors, that is, investors who hold SRI equity funds. Total portfolio value refers to investors’
total portfolio value across SRI and conventional investments. Amount invested in SRI equity is
the average amount investors hold in SRI equity. % of equity invested in SRI equity is the amount
invested in SRI equity divided by the total amount invested in equity. % of SRI investments in SRI
equity is the fraction of all socially responsible funds invested in SRI equity funds rather than SRI
bond funds.
% of
Investors
Total Portfolio
Value (€)
Amount
Invested in SRI
Equity (€)
% of Equity
Invested in
SRI Equity
% of SRI
Investments
in SRI
Equity
Conventional
investors
83.8% 70,235 – – –
Socially responsible
investors
16.2% 104,332 4,574 23.0% 94.2%
Overall 100% 75,778 – – –
IV. Why Do Investors Hold SRI Equity Funds?
Our primary objective is to shed light on the role of financial and social mo-
tives in holding SRI funds. To do so, we begin in Section IV.A by comparing
the realized portfolio performance of socially responsible and conventional in-
vestors. Next in Section IV.B, we examine investors’ expectations regarding
the return and risk of SRI funds. In Section IV.C, we use regression analysis to
explore the role of financial as well as social motives, controlling for a battery
of individual background variables. In regard to social motives, we distinguish
between intrinsic social preferences, which refer to prosocial motives that do
not provide any future (material) benefit to the individual itself, and social sig-
naling, which refers to motives to show others that one invests in a responsible
manner because doing so improves one’s own social reputation.21
A. Portfolio Performance
Panel A of Table II reports the realized performance of the equity part of
socially responsible investors’ (column (1)) and conventional investors’ (column
(2)) portfolios over the one, three, and five years prior to the survey and experi-
ment. Note that the reported returns correspond to the returns that individual
investors realized on the funds they selected in their portfolio, and not to the
funds’ aggregate performance.
21 Several theories in finance and economics introduce social preferences in their models (e.g.,
Andreoni (1990), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Heinkel,
Kraus, and Zechner (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002), Sobel (2005), and Gollier and Pouget
(2014)). For contributions on signaling theory, see Glazer and Konrad (1996), Bénabou and Tirole
(2006), and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008).
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Table II
Investment Performance of Socially Responsible and Conventional
Investors
Panel A presents the realized portfolio performance of the equity part of sample investors’ portfo-
lios, with results reported separately for socially responsible investors and conventional investors.
Panel B is limited to socially responsible investors and compares the performance of the “SRI
equity” and the “Non-SRI equity” parts of their portfolio. Panel C reports the average yearly total
expense ratio (TER) of SRI equity funds and conventional equity funds. p-values refer to two-sided
t-tests.
Panel A. All Investors
Socially Responsible
Investors
Conventional
Investors p-Value
1-year portfolio performance
Mean return 7.45% 7.02% 0.0678
Volatility 16.05% 15.29% 0.3494
Sharpe ratio 0.95 1.15 0.0414
Average 3-year portfolio performance
Mean return 0.16% 0.63% 0.0206
Volatility 23.51% 22.79% 0.2757
Sharpe ratio 0.01 0.06 0.1781
Average 5-year portfolio performance
Mean return −1.29% −1.18% 0.5003
Volatility 20.19% 19.69% 0.3394
Sharpe ratio −0.07 −0.06 0.4811
Panel B. Socially Responsible Investors
SRI Equity Non-SRI Equity p-Value
1-year portfolio performance
Mean return 2.71% 7.88% 0.0000
Volatility 30.60% 14.00% 0.0000
Sharpe ratio 0.45 1.07 0.0000
Average 3-year portfolio performance
Mean return −0.82% 0.53% 0.0000
Volatility 30.76% 22.57% 0.0000
Sharpe ratio −0.02 0.04 0.0019
Average 5-year portfolio performance
Mean return −4.06% −0.98% 0.0000
Volatility 17.46% 18.72% 0.2568
Sharpe ratio −0.19 −0.06 0.0000
Panel C. Administrative Cost Ratios
SRI Equity Funds Conventional Equity Funds
Average yearly expense ratio (TER) 2.20% 1.50% 0.0230
The results show that, overall, the equity performance of socially responsible
is similar to that of conventional investors. In the one year before the exper-
iment, socially responsible investors realized marginally significantly higher
Mean returns on their equity investments than conventional investors but
2520 The Journal of Finance R©
Figure 1. Return expectations of SRI equity funds. This figure provides the distribution of return
expectations of SRI equity funds separately for investors with and without an SRI equity fund (“SRI
equity” and “No SRI equity,” respectively). The bars depict investor responses to the statement “I
expect that the returns of socially responsible equity funds compared to conventional equity funds
are: 1 = much lower, 2 = a bit lower, 3 = the same, 4 = a bit higher, 5 = much higher.” The category
“I don’t know” is excluded from the figure; it was chosen by 2.5% of socially responsible investors
and 10.2% of conventional investors. (Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
significantly worse Sharpe ratios (p = 0.0414). Over the three years before the
experiment, socially responsible investors realized significantly lower Mean re-
turns than conventional investors (p = 0.0206) but did not differ in terms of
the Sharpe ratio. No difference exists in the performance of socially responsible
and conventional investors for the five years preceding the experiment.
Panel B limits attention to socially responsible investors and compares the
performance of the “SRI equity” part of their portfolio to the performance
of the “non-SRI equity” part. The results show that socially responsible in-
vestors realized significantly lower Mean returns and worse Sharpe ratios on
the SRI equity part of their portfolio over all three horizons considered (p <
0.002).
Finally, Panel C of the table shows that the average yearly total expense
ratio (TER) is significantly higher for socially responsible equity funds than for
conventional equity funds (2.2% versus 1.5%, p = 0.023). These extra fees are
used to screen portfolios on environmental and social criteria.
Taken together the above results indicate that financial motives are unlikely
to be the main driver behind SRI. However, investors’ subjective performance
expectations regarding SRI funds could be biased and if the bias is sufficiently
large investors may still invest in SRI funds for purely financial reasons. We
explore this possibility next.
B. Expected Returns and Risk Perceptions about SRI Funds
Figure 1 displays the distribution of expected returns on SRI equity funds
compared to conventional equity funds for socially responsible and conventional
investors (see also Table A.4 in the Appendix). The figure shows that both
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Figure 2. Risk perceptions of SRI equity funds. This figure provides the distribution of risk
perceptions of SRI funds separately for investors with and without an SRI equity fund (“SRI
equity” and “No SRI equity,” respectively). The bars depict investor responses on a 7-point Likert
scale to the statement “Socially responsible equity funds are more risky than conventional equity
funds,” where 1 corresponds to “Fully disagree” and 7 to “Fully agree.” (Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com)
investor types are relatively pessimistic regarding the performance of SRI
funds, with only 16.5% and 14.5% of socially responsible and conventional
investors, respectively, expecting higher returns on SRI than on conventional
funds. Socially responsible investors are slightly less pessimistic about the
returns of SRI funds than are conventional investors. For instance, 48.7% of
socially responsible investors and 56.1% of conventional investors expect to
earn much or a bit lower returns on SRI than on conventional funds. The dif-
ference between socially responsible and conventional investors is marginally
significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.054).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the perceived risk on SRI equity funds rel-
ative to conventional equity funds for socially responsible and conventional in-
vestors. Socially responsible and conventional investors appear to have similar
risk perceptions regarding SRI equity funds. The difference in the distributions
of risk perceptions between socially responsible and conventional investors is
not significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.186).
Taken together, the results on return expectations and risk perceptions show
that socially responsible investors have a slightly more positive view of the
performance of SRI equity funds than conventional investors. Although the
differences are small, performance expectations could still play some role in
explaining why investors hold SRI funds. Another financial motive to hold
SRI funds could be risk diversification. Although investors might perceive the
risk of an SRI fund in isolation to be equally risky as a conventional equity
fund, they might hold an SRI fund to diversify their portfolio. The survey
data show that this motive is virtually absent. Only 5.4% of all socially re-
sponsible investors indicate that they hold SRI funds to pursue diversification
benefits.
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C. Regression Results: Social and Financial Motives of Socially Responsible
Investors
Table III studies simultaneously investors’ different possible motives for
holding socially responsible mutual funds. The first specification presents
marginal effects of a probit regression in which the dependent variable is a
dummy that takes the value of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund and
zero otherwise. In our specification, we control for several variables related to
investors’ portfolios, namely, Average holding period, Log total portfolio value,
and Log number of transactions. We also control for several individual-level
characteristics, in particular, Investment knowledge, University degree, Risk
preferences, Female, and Age, as well as Low income, High income, and Untold
income, where medium income is the omitted reference category for the income
measures. Below we discuss results for social motives, financial motives, and
the other characteristics in turn.
As we noted before, in investigating the role of social motives, we distinguish
between intrinsic social preferences and signaling. The results for specification
(1) show that stronger intrinsic social preferences have a highly significant
positive effect on the likelihood of investing in a socially responsible manner
(p = 0.003). For example, an investor who equally splits earnings in the trust
game with the first mover is 2 * 0.0694 = 14 percentage points more likely to
hold an SRI fund than a completely selfish investor who returns zero to the first
mover. This effect is economically substantial given that 16% of investors in our
sample hold SRI equity funds. Signaling is also significantly positively related
to the likelihood of investing in SRI equity funds. An investor who scores one
point higher on the signaling variable is 2.3 percentage points more likely to
invest in an SRI equity fund (p = 0.035).
Specification (1) further shows that Lower expected returns on SRI is nega-
tive and marginally statistically significant (p = 0.071). Specifically, an investor
who expects SRI equity funds to underperform relative to conventional equity
funds is 5.8 percentage points less likely to hold an SRI equity fund. However,
investors who expect SRI equity funds to perform better than conventional eq-
uity funds are not significantly more likely to hold such a fund (p = 0.239). This
suggests that investors do not hold SRI equity funds because they expect these
funds to financially outperform conventional funds, but rather that investors
who are pessimistic about the performance of SRI funds avoid such funds. The
risk perception dummies are not significant, which indicates that investors do
not hold SRI equity funds because they perceive their risk to be lower. These
results suggest that the perceived performance of SRI equity funds does play
some role in SRI decisions, but also that financial motives alone do not explain
the decision to invest in SRI funds.
Specification (1) of Table III also shows that investors who hold funds longer
(Average holding period) are more likely to invest in SRI equity funds. This
finding indicates that socially responsible investors have a longer investment
horizon. Investors who hold their funds one year longer are 0.0023 * 12 = 2.76
percentage points more likely to hold an SRI equity fund.
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Table III
Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible Equity Funds?
Specification (1) presents marginal effects of a probit regression. The dependent variable is SRI
equity, which takes the value of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund in the month investors
participated in the experiment and survey and zero otherwise. Specification (2) presents coeffi-
cients of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is % in SRI equity funds, which is equal to
the investor’s holdings in SRI equity funds as a share of his or her total investments in equity.
In specification (2) only investors who hold at least one SRI equity fund are considered. Social
preferences: ratio of money that second movers in the trust game send back; Signaling: the ex-
tent to which an investor agrees with the statement “I often talk about investment with others”;
Sharpe ratio: the Sharpe ratio of the investor’s portfolio performance; Lower expected returns on
SRI: dummy variable equal to one if the investor believes that the returns on SRI equity funds are
a bit or much lower than on conventional equity funds; Higher expected returns on SRI: dummy
variable equal to one if the investor believes that the returns on SRI equity funds are a bit or much
higher than on conventional equity funds; Lower perceived risk on SRI: dummy variable equal to
one if the investor disagrees with the statement that the risk of SRI equity funds is higher than
the risk of conventional equity funds; Higher perceived risk on SRI: dummy variable equal to one
if the investor agrees with the statement that the risk of SRI equity funds is higher than the risk
of conventional equity funds; Average holding period: average number of months the investor has
held a mutual fund in the five years before the survey and experiment; Log total portfolio value:
logarithm of the investor’s average euro amount invested at the provider; Log number of trans-
actions: logarithm of the number of transactions the investor made in the year before the survey
and experiment; Investment knowledge: the extent to which the investor agrees with the state-
ment “My investment knowledge is good”; University degree: dummy variable equal to one if the
investor reports having a university degree; Risk preferences: experimental measure of investor’s
risk tolerance; Female: dummy variable equal to one if investor reports being a woman; Age: the
investor’s age; Low Income: dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s reported annual gross
family income is below 60,000 euro; High Income: dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s
reported annual gross family income is above 100,000 euro; Untold income: dummy variable equal
to one if the investor does not disclose income. For definitions of the variables, see also Table A.3.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2)
Social motives
Social preferences 0.0694*** −0.0204
(0.0233) (0.0479)
Signaling 0.0228** −0.0181
(0.0108) (0.0169)
Financial motives
Sharpe ratio 0.0025 0.0580
(0.0205) (0.0537)
Lower expected returns on SRI −0.0581* −0.0730
(0.0322) (0.0492)
Higher expected returns on SRI −0.0433 −0.0358
(0.0368) (0.0677)
Lower perceived risk on SRI −0.0422 −0.0141
(0.0302) (0.0503)
Higher perceived risk on SRI 0.0065 0.0639
(0.0441) (0.0720)
(Continued)
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Table III—Continued
Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0023** −0.0015
(0.0010) (0.0019)
Log total portfolio value 0.0390*** −0.0572***
(0.0126) (0.0197)
Log number of transactions 0.0252** 0.0162
(0.0114) (0.0266)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0022 −0.0315*
(0.0119) (0.0188)
University degree 0.0553* 0.0505
(0.0314) (0.0547)
Risk preferences −0.0001 0.0015**
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Female 0.0074 −0.0241
(0.0424) (0.0584)
Age −0.0025* 0.0009
(0.0014) (0.0022)
Low income 0.0243 0.0196
(0.0387) (0.0608)
High income −0.0255 0.0176
(0.0383) (0.0645)
Untold income −0.0062 −0.0121
(0.0417) (0.0666)
Constant 0.8089***
(0.2892)
Observations 625 121
R² 0.1820
The value of the portfolio (Log total portfolio value) is positively related to
the likelihood of investing in SRI. For instance, a doubling of the portfolio size
is associated with a 3.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of investing
in a socially responsible manner (p = 0.002). This relatively strong effect is
intuitive as investors with larger portfolios likely spread their greater wealth
over various funds, including SRI funds. We also see a slightly positive and
significant effect of the number of transactions (Log number of transactions),
which indicates that more active investors are more likely to invest in SRI
funds.
Of the individual-level characteristics, only University degree and Age exhibit
statistically (marginally) significant effects: having a university degree tends
to increase the likelihood of holding SRI funds whereas being older decreases
it.
Specification (2) presents results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion for investors who hold at least one SRI fund. We find that, conditional on
holding an SRI equity fund, neither social preferences nor signaling explain the
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percentage invested in SRI equity funds. These results suggest that, while so-
cial motives are key for investing in a socially responsible manner at all, they do
not influence the percentage invested in SRI once this hurdle has been cleared.
Rather, financial motives appear to determine the percentage invested in SRI
funds. Investors with a larger portfolio invest a significantly smaller fraction
of their portfolio in SRI funds (p = 0.004). This result is consistent with the
interpretation that these investors diversify their portfolio over non-SRI funds
more than investors with smaller portfolios.
Of the individual characteristics considered, only Investment knowledge
and Risk preferences exhibit (marginally) significant effects on the share
of SRI held. Better investment knowledge has a marginally significant
negative effect, whereas higher risk tolerance has a significant positive
effect.
In Table IV, we explore the role of social preferences and social signal-
ing in more detail using dummy variables. In specifications (1) and (3), we
present marginal effects from a probit regression in which the dependent vari-
able is a dummy that takes the value of one if an investor holds an SRI
equity fund and zero otherwise. In specifications (2) and (4), we present co-
efficients of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the percent-
age invested in SRI equity funds for those investors who hold an SRI eq-
uity fund. The variable Strong social preferences takes the value of one if
an investor shares the money in the experiment at least equally and zero
otherwise. The variable Strong signaling takes the value of one if an in-
vestor scores greater than or equal to the median for signaling and zero
otherwise.
The results in specification (1) show that the relation between social prefer-
ences and the likelihood of holding an SRI fund that we find above is robust
to this nonlinear specification of the social preference variable. Investors who
give away at least half of their money in the experiment are significantly more
likely to invest in SRI funds than more selfish investors (p = 0.033). Consis-
tent with the linear specification for social preferences reported in Table III,
strong social preferences explain the likelihood of investing in SRI funds but
not the percentage invested in SRI funds conditional on holding an SRI fund
(specification (2)). This again indicates that social preferences are important
for the decision of whether to buy an SRI fund, but less important for the
decision of what fraction of all equity investments to allocate to SRI equity
funds.
Consistent with the results of the linear specification for signaling, the vari-
able Strong signaling is not significant for explaining either the choice to hold
an SRI fund or the percentage held in SRI funds. However, signaling may mat-
ter most for investors with weak social preferences, because these investors
are likely to hold SRI funds only if doing so benefits their reputation. We test
this hypothesis in specifications (3) and (4).
To do so, we decompose the full set of investors into subgroups according
to the strength of their social preferences and the strength of their social sig-
naling. The first subgroup consists of investors with strong social preferences,
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Table IV
The Effect of Strong and Weak Social Preferences and Signaling
Specifications (1) and (3) present marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable
is SRI equity, which takes the value of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund in the month
investors participated in the experiment and survey and zero otherwise. Specifications (2) and (4)
present coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is % in SRI equity funds, which
is equal to the investor’s holdings in SRI equity funds as a share of his or her total investments
in equity. In specifications (2) and (4) only investors who hold at least one SRI equity fund are
considered. Strong social preferences: dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s average return
ratio in the trust game is such that it gives the other player at least half of the money in the
experiment; Strong signaling: dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s signaling strength is
greater than or equal to the median level of signaling; Weak social preferences & strong signaling:
dummy variable equal to one if both the investor’s average return ratio in the trust game is such
that it gives the other player less than half of the money in the experiment and the investor
exhibits strong signaling. For definitions of the other variables, see Table III and Table A.3. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social motives
Strong social preferences 0.0644** −0.0138 0.1084** −0.1155
(0.0313) (0.0485) (0.0441) (0.0812)
Strong signaling 0.0386 −0.0684
(0.0317) (0.0511)
Weak social preferences
& strong signaling
0.0686 −0.1604**
(0.0435) (0.0780)
Financial motives
Sharpe ratio 0.0037 0.0510 0.0041 0.0494
(0.0211) (0.0519) (0.0212) (0.0552)
Lower expected returns
on SRI
−0.0561* −0.0700 −0.0557* −0.0702
(0.0325) (0.0475) (0.0324) (0.0459)
Higher expected returns
on SRI
−0.0441 −0.0369 −0.0432 −0.0369
(0.0372) (0.0670) (0.0371) (0.0651)
Lower perceived risk on
SRI
−0.0375 −0.0194 −0.0371 −0.0218
(0.0303) (0.0514) (0.0303) (0.0499)
Higher perceived risk on
SRI
0.0028 0.0606 0.0042 0.0586
(0.0441) (0.0696) (0.0443) (0.0654)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0022** −0.0016 0.0023** −0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0019)
Log total portfolio value 0.0375*** −0.0590*** 0.0371*** −0.0566***
(0.0127) (0.0199) (0.0127) (0.0191)
Log number of
transactions
0.0255** 0.0150 0.0256** 0.0088
(0.0113) (0.0257) (0.0112) (0.0250)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0068 −0.0339* 0.0063 −0.0340*
(0.0117) (0.0186) (0.0114) (0.0181)
University degree 0.0503 0.0576 0.0504 0.0456
(0.0316) (0.0544) (0.0316) (0.0539)
(Continued)
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Table IV—Continued
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk preferences −0.0001 0.0015** −0.0001 0.0013**
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Female 0.0024 −0.0234 −0.0014 −0.0261
(0.0419) (0.0587) (0.0410) (0.0538)
Age −0.0026* 0.0009 −0.0027* 0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0023)
Low income 0.0230 0.0177 0.0224 0.0125
(0.0390) (0.0609) (0.0389) (0.0599)
High income −0.0275 0.0278 −0.0285 0.0239
(0.0385) (0.0655) (0.0382) (0.0642)
Untold income −0.0090 −0.0075 −0.0088 −0.0040
(0.0416) (0.0678) (0.0413) (0.0632)
Constant 0.8047*** 0.9032***
(0.2549) (0.2599)
Observations 625 121 625 121
R² 0.1887 0.2211
irrespective of their strength of signaling.22 As above, these investors are cap-
tured by the dummy variable Strong social preferences. Investors with weak
social preferences are further divided into a subgroup with strong signaling
and a subgroup with weak signaling. The investors with both weak social pref-
erences and strong signaling are captured by the dummy variable Weak social
preferences & strong signaling, which takes the value of one if both the in-
vestor gives the other player less than half of the money in the experiment and
scores at or above the median for signaling, and zero otherwise. The remain-
ing investors, that is, those with weak social preferences and weak signaling,
form the base group. The coefficients on the dummy variables Strong social
preferences and Weak social preferences & strong signaling should therefore be
interpreted relative to this base group.
The results, reported in specification (3) of Table IV, suggest that investors
with both weak social preferences and strong signaling are more likely to in-
vest in SRI funds than investors with both weak social preferences and weak
signaling, but the statistical significance is not strong (p = 0.103). The results
confirm that investors with strong social preferences are significantly more
likely to invest in SRI funds (p = 0.009).
Importantly, specification (4) of Table IV shows that investors who hold SRI
funds and have both weak social preferences and strong signaling invest a
22 For investors with strong social preferences, we do not distinguish between weak and strong
signaling because we find that the relation between strong social preferences and holding SRI is
almost identical for strong and weak signaling (see Table IAVII in the Internet Appendix). We
therefore merge these subgroups into the group Strong social preferences to increase statistical
power.
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significantly smaller fraction of their portfolio in SRI funds (p = 0.042). This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that selfish investors who are strongly
motivated by social reputation concerns are investing a rather small fraction
in SRI funds when they invest in SRI. The smaller fraction in SRI funds allows
these investors to signal that they invest in SRI funds while keeping the po-
tential financial disadvantages of holding SRI to a minimum. The effects of all
other variables that we considered are similar to those reported in Table III.
Next, we examine whether beliefs about the social impact of SRI drive invest-
ment in SRI and whether our results reported so far are robust to controlling
for such beliefs. Table V reports on regression analysis, in which we explore
whether investors who hold more positive views about the social impact of
SRI funds are also more likely to hold such funds. Column (1) shows that this
is indeed the case (p = 0.016). However, consistent with our result for social
preferences, investors who hold a positive view of the social impact of SRI
do not hold a larger fraction of their portfolio in SRI funds (column (2), p =
0.987). Similar to specifications (3) and (4) of Table IV, in specifications (3)
and (4) of Table V we use the variables Strong social preferences and Weak
social preferences & strong signaling. Importantly, the results show that the
previously documented effects of social preferences and signaling are robust
to the inclusion of the perceived social impact variable. The effects of all other
variables considered are similar to those reported for the original specification
(see Table IV).
In addition to the analyses above, we have also conducted a number of ad-
ditional regressions to check the robustness of the relation between social mo-
tives and SRI. The results of these tests are reported in Tables A.5 to A.8 in
the Appendix and Table IAVI in the Internet Appendix. The regressions re-
ported in Table A.5 exclude all investors who believe that SRI are a marketing
trick (10.6% of the sample). Table A.6 excludes all investors who incorrectly
answered at least one question from the comprehension questions of the exper-
iment (11.3% of the sample). Table A.7 excludes all investors who expect higher
returns on SRI and perceive lower risk on SRI but still do not invest in these
funds (6.5% of the sample). Table A.8 includes the full set of signaling dum-
mies. Finally, Table IAVI also includes investors who held an SRI equity fund
at least once over the period between 2006 and the time the survey was taken.
The results reported in these tables show that our main results regarding the
effects of social motives on SRI are robust to these variations.
V. Characteristics Related to Intrinsic Social Preferences
and Social Signaling
We next investigate which investor characteristics are related to social pref-
erences and social signaling. Table VI reports the results of OLS regressions
with Social preferences (specification (1)) or Signaling (specifications (2) and
(3)) as the dependent variable and portfolio characteristics as well as indi-
vidual characteristics as explanatory variables. Specification (1) shows that,
for social preferences, only the coefficient of Risk preferences is marginally
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Table V
Perceived Social Impact of SRI
Specifications (1) and (3) present marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable
is SRI equity, which takes the value of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund in the month
investors participated in the experiment and survey and zero otherwise. Specifications (2) and (4)
present coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is % in SRI equity funds, which is
equal to the investor’s holdings in SRI equity funds as a share of the total investments in equity.
In specifications (2) and (4) only investors who hold at least one SRI equity fund are considered.
Perceived social impact: dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s agreement with the statement
“Socially responsible investment funds have a positive influence on society” is greater than or equal
to the median level of agreement. For definitions of the other variables, see Tables III, IV, and A.3.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social motives
Perceived social impact 0.0470** −0.0005 0.0755** 0.0191
(0.0194) (0.0275) (0.0330) (0.0497)
Strong social preferences 0.1033** −0.1167
(0.0437) (0.0810)
Weak social preferences
& strong signaling
0.0688 −0.1620**
(0.0434) (0.0781)
Financial motives
Sharpe Ratio −0.0018 0.0142 0.0033 0.0493
(0.0079) (0.0189) (0.0221) (0.0547)
Lower expected returns
on SRI
−0.0701*** −0.0598* −0.0534* −0.0682
(0.0202) (0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0457)
Higher expected returns
on SRI
−0.0096 −0.0473 −0.0486 −0.0380
(0.0259) (0.0396) (0.0362) (0.0650)
Lower perceived risk on
SRI
−0.0199 −0.0355 −0.0542* −0.0264
(0.0187) (0.0265) (0.0306) (0.0534)
Higher perceived risk on
SRI
0.0019 0.0120 −0.0066 0.0526
(0.0246) (0.0397) (0.0421) (0.0707)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0006 −0.0026** 0.0022** −0.0020
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0019)
Log total portfolio value 0.0276*** −0.0542*** 0.0373*** −0.0564***
(0.0074) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0190)
Log number of
transactions
0.0048 −0.0146 0.0265** 0.0093
(0.0069) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0249)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0114* −0.0489*** 0.0058 −0.0340*
(0.0063) (0.0122) (0.0113) (0.0183)
University degree 0.0311* 0.0540** 0.0535* 0.0460
(0.0182) (0.0262) (0.0315) (0.0540)
Risk preferences −0.0001 0.0004 −0.0000 0.0014**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Female −0.0057 0.0261 −0.0130 −0.0273
(0.0229) (0.0358) (0.0399) (0.0544)
(Continued)
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Table V—Continued
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age −0.0037*** −0.0019 −0.0029** 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0024)
Low income 0.0231 0.0107 0.0280 0.0157
(0.0228) (0.0353) (0.0390) (0.0638)
High income −0.0090 0.0230 −0.0226 0.0276
(0.0234) (0.0339) (0.0387) (0.0675)
Untold income −0.0201 −0.0354 0.0037 0.0019
(0.0253) (0.0325) (0.0430) (0.0687)
Constant 1.1609*** 0.8796***
(0.1849) (0.2705)
Observations 1,803 346 625 121
R² 0.2186 0.2223
significant, and small. Interestingly, male and female investors are equally
prosocial in the experiment, and there is no difference between young and old
investors.
Specification (2) looks at the determinants of social signaling and shows that
Investment knowledge is positively related to signaling (p < 0.001) and that
women (Female) and older investors (Age) signal less about investments than
men and younger investors (p < 0.001 and p = 0.046, respectively). In addition,
investors with a University degree care less about signaling than less educated
investors.
These results show that intrinsic social preferences are not confined to in-
vestors with specific demographic or portfolio-related characteristics. None of
the characteristics above are good proxies for such preferences, which implies
that it is important to measure such preferences independently. Social signal-
ing, in contrast, is stronger for young male investors with good investment
knowledge. These results indicate that the two types of social motivations for
investing in a socially responsible manner correspond to different types of
investors.
Specification (3) shows that Strong social preferences are significantly neg-
atively related to signaling (p < 0.001). This finding is consistent with the
interpretation that, for investors with a strong intrinsic motivation, it is less
important to signal their prosocial behavior to others than it is for investors
whose intrinsic motivation is weak. This result is also consistent with the ef-
fect documented in Table IV that investors with weak social preferences but a
strong signaling motive who hold SRI funds hold a relatively small fraction of
such funds.23
23 In line with existing research on gender in finance, we find that self-reported investment
knowledge is lower for women than for men (average rating on 7-point Likert scale: men = 4.03,
women = 3.29; p < 0.001, two-sided t-test). To check the robustness of our regression results in
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Table VI
Covariates of Intrinsic Social Preferences and Social Signaling
Specification (1) reports coefficients of an OLS regression with Social preferences as the dependent
variable. Specifications (2) and (3) report OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is Sig-
naling. For definitions of the variables, see Tables III and A.3. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Social Preferences Signaling Signaling
(1) (2) (3)
Strong social preferences −0.3907***
(0.1037)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0001 −0.0020 −0.0034
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0037)
Log total portfolio value −0.0045 −0.0356 −0.0229
(0.0218) (0.0244) (0.0399)
Log number of transactions −0.0076 0.0103 −0.0482
(0.0227) (0.0248) (0.0437)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge −0.0061 0.4712*** 0.4956***
(0.0213) (0.0228) (0.0378)
University degree −0.0125 −0.1367** −0.0129
(0.0543) (0.0616) (0.1045)
Risk preferences 0.0012* −0.0011 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Female −0.0583 −0.3191*** −0.2895**
(0.0712) (0.0749) (0.1377)
Age −0.0006 −0.0060** −0.0029
(0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0050)
Low income −0.0406 0.0218 −0.1095
(0.0676) (0.0763) (0.1344)
High income 0.0021 0.0693 −0.1217
(0.0703) (0.0824) (0.1354)
Untold income −0.0804 0.0422 −0.1211
(0.0765) (0.0902) (0.1444)
Constant 1.5046*** 2.0682*** 1.8998***
(0.2738) (0.2868) (0.5004)
Observations 679 1,991 679
Adjusted-R² −0.0066 0.2110 0.2234
VI. Are SRIs Related to Charitable Donations?
In this section, we examine whether SRI substitute for other expressions of
social concern, such as charitable giving. Graff Zivin and Small (2005) theorize
that individuals may perceive SRI as a more efficient way of achieving their
social goals than direct donations to charity. In their model, donations and
corporate philanthropy are perfect substitutes.
regard to this correlation, in Table VI we run additional regressions for Signaling without the
Female dummy in specification (2) and without the Investment knowledge variable in specification
(3). The results, reported in Table IAI of the Internet Appendix, are robust to these variations.
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Table VII
Relation between Socially Responsible Investments
and Charitable Giving
The table presents an OLS regression in which the dependent variable Log donations is the loga-
rithm of the self-reported average yearly donation by the investor. For definitions of the variables,
see Tables III and A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Log Donations
SRI equity 0.4100**
(0.1765)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period −0.0006
(0.0046)
Log total portfolio value 0.0604
(0.0473)
Log number of transactions −0.0148
(0.0498)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0271
(0.0502)
University degree 0.0692
(0.1354)
Risk preferences −0.0016
(0.0017)
Female 0.0757
(0.1748)
Age 0.0305***
(0.0068)
Low income −0.2878*
(0.1602)
High income 0.1670
(0.1675)
Untold income −0.3072
(0.2454)
Constant 3.6367***
(0.6045)
Observations 519
R² 0.0809
If SRI substitute for donations, ceteris paribus we would expect a negative
relation between the likelihood of holding an SRI fund and the amount donated
to charity. We test this hypothesis in Table VII using OLS. Although we can-
not address causal effects with our data, our results can provide interesting
evidence on the correlation between charity donations and SRI.
We define the dependent variable Log donations as the logarithm of the self-
reported average euro amount that the investor donates to charity per year.
The independent variable of main interest is SRI equity, which takes the value
of one if an investor holds at least one SRI equity fund and zero otherwise. An
eventual positive correlation between SRI and donations could be due to income
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and wealth effects. To control for this possibility, we include investors’ portfolio
value and self-reported income as explanatory variables. We also control for
portfolio and individual characteristics included in the analyses above.
The results reported in Table VII show that donations are significantly posi-
tively related to holding an SRI equity fund (p = 0.021). Specifically, an investor
who holds an SRI equity fund donates 41% more to charity. We therefore reject
the hypothesis that SRI and charity donations are substitutes.
VII. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate why individuals hold socially responsible equity
funds. We find that investors’ intrinsic social preferences and, to a lesser extent,
social signaling are major factors determining the likelihood of holding SRI
equity funds. Financial motivations also play a role in SRI decisions. Investors
who expect SRI equity funds to underperform relative to conventional equity
funds are less likely to invest in a socially responsible manner. We also find
that most socially responsible investors expect SRI funds to earn lower returns
than conventional funds, to achieve worse Sharpe ratios, and to pay higher
fees. The latter findings suggest that on average investors with a strong social
motivation are willing to forgo financial returns in order to invest in accordance
with their social preferences.
Our results have important implications for asset prices. In particular, be-
cause SRI are growing quickly in volume (EUROSIF (2014), SIF (2014)), our
results on the effect of social preferences on SRI suggest that social preferences
as well as social reputation motives may influence asset prices to a greater ex-
tent as the proportion of socially responsible investors in the market continues
to grow.
We note that our sample is based on Dutch investors. This raises the question
of the extent to which our findings generalize to other countries. According to
EUROSIF (2014) and SIF (2014), the total assets under management in SRI
are about 1.2 trillion euro in the Netherlands and 4.9 trillion euro in the United
States. Thus, the amount invested in SRI is relatively large for a country the
size of the Netherlands. To determine whether this is because the Dutch are
more proenvironmental or prosocial than investors in the United States or
other countries, we looked at several measures available in the literature.
According to data from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey As-
sociation (2016)), Dutch attitudes toward the environment are not particularly
distinct. For instance, 45.2% of the Dutch agree that protecting the environ-
ment should have priority even if this means slower economic growth, which is
on par with the 38.2% for the United States and 55.0% for Germany. A similar
result obtains when individuals are asked to indicate how strongly they iden-
tify with the statement “Looking after the environment is important to me;
to care for nature and save life resources.” In the Netherlands 62% of respon-
dents agreed that this is “(Somewhat) Like me,” compared to 66% in the United
States and 65% in Germany. Behavioral data paint a similar picture. Accord-
ing to ERNOP (2013), in 2013 households’ per capita charity donations totaled
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116 euro in the Netherlands, which is higher than the 78 euro in Germany but
lower than the 256 euros in the United Kingdom.24
These figures suggest that our results are not driven by different attitudes
of the Dutch toward the environment and charitable giving and thus they may
generalize to other countries. Whether our results do indeed carry through to
different countries is ultimately an empirical question. Future research could
investigate how the relation between social preferences and SRI is affected by
variations in culture, economic development, religion, and other socioeconomic
factors that may impact social preferences themselves as well as their effect on
economic behavior in the field.
We find that financial motives play a relatively minor role in the decision to
hold SRI equity. A caveat is in order here because we measure some impor-
tant financial motives, like risk perception and expected return on SRI, using
survey questions. As a result, these measures are likely more noisy than our
measures of social preferences and risk preferences, which are based on an in-
centivized experiment. Future research could test the robustness of our results
by developing incentive-compatible mechanisms for eliciting risk and return
perceptions of SRI and conventional equity.
Our measure of social signaling also comes from survey data and thus is also
prone to larger measurement error than our incentivized measures. Moreover,
the proxy “talking about investment” is likely not a pure measure of social
signaling. It is difficult to elicit social signaling in an incentive-compatible
way, and it is also difficult to control for the way investors can signal informa-
tion. These concerns may call for laboratory experiments on SRI where social
preferences and social signaling could be more easily measured and signaling
possibilities and content more tightly controlled.
We focus on preferences for investments in SRI equity funds. Recently, SRI
has expanded to other asset classes such as hedge funds, impact investments,
and fixed income. It would be interesting to explore the relative importance of
social preferences, social signaling, and financial motives for these classes of
SRI as well.
We deliberately use a broad definition of social preferences as a first approach
to addressing the question of whether social preferences influence portfolio
choice. Future research could test how specific models of other-regarding prefer-
ences are related to SRI. For instance, it would be interesting to learn whether
socially responsible investors are more altruistic (Fehr and Fischbacher (2003))
than conventional investors or whether they receive more warm-glow from do-
ing good (Andreoni (1990)).
In our study, we experimentally elicit social preferences using a trust game
and relate it to field behavior regarding investment choices. Therefore, our
paper contributes to the discussion about the stability of social preferences
across different decision domains and the external relevance of lab experi-
ments (Karlan (2005), List (2006), Levitt and List (2007), Benz and Meier
24 Comparisons with other countries show a similar picture. For details we refer the reader to
Tables IAII to IAV in the Internet Appendix.
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(2008), Falk and Heckman (2009), Baran, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010), Fehr
and Leibbrandt (2011), Stoop, Noussair, and Van Soest (2012), Stoop (2014),
Galizzi and Navarro-Martı́nez (2015)). Investors in our study were unaware
that we matched their survey responses and experimental behavior to their
(anonymized) trading records. This design mitigates the potential problem that
socially responsible investors want to behave consistently prosocially in the ex-
periment (for evidence on consistency, see Gneezy et al. (2012)) and minimizes
experimenter demand effects. We find that social preferences measured in an
experiment with relatively small stakes are strongly related to field behav-
ior in the form of SRI worth thousands of euro. This result indicates that lab
experiments on social preferences do have external relevance.
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Appendix
Table A.1
Survey Respondents and Overall Sample Characteristics
This table compares the mean characteristics of all investors invited to participate in the survey
and experiments to the mean characteristics of the respondents. Variable definitions are provided
in Table A.3. Note that we purposefully oversampled socially responsible investors in the sur-
vey to increase the power of our analyses in which we compare socially responsible investors to
conventional investors. The response rate for socially responsible investors is 12% and that for
conventional investors is 8%.
Invited Sample (n = 38,382) Respondents (n = 3,254)
Female 24.7% 20.6%
Age 55.5 57.9
Total portfolio value (euro) 61,509 74,259
% holding an SRI equity fund 8.4% 11.0%
Table A.2
Choice List in Risk Preferences Elicitation Experiment
Safe Payment Lottery
1) €0 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
2) €10 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
3) €20 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
4) €30 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
5) €40 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
6) €50 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
7) €60 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
8) €70 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
(Continued)
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Table A.2—Continued
Safe Payment Lottery
9) €80 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
10) €90 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
11) €100 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
12) €110 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
13) €120 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
14) €130 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
15) €140 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
16) €150 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
17) €160 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
18) €170 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
19) €180 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
20) €190 for sure or 50% chance of winning €300 and 50% chance of winning €0
Table A.3
Variable Definitions
Variable Measure
Administrative
SRI equity fund Dummy variable equal to one if the investor holds an SRI
equity fund in his or her portfolio in the month he or she
participated in the survey and experiment.
Socially responsible investor An investor who holds at least one SRI equity fund.
Percentage in SRI equity funds The average amount the investor invested in SRI equity funds
in the year after the survey and experiment, as a percentage
of the total amount he or she invested in equity funds.
Log total portfolio value Logarithm of the investor’s average euro amount invested at
the provider in the year before the survey and experiment.
Log number of transactions Logarithm of the number of transactions the investor made in
the year before the survey and experiment. To account for
extremes, this measure is trimmed by excluding the 1st and
the 99th percentiles.
Average holding period Average number of months the investor holds a mutual fund in
the five years before the survey and experiment.
Mean portfolio returns Average portfolio returns in the year before the investor
participated in the survey and experiment (in %). To account
for extremes, this measure is trimmed by excluding the 1st
and the 99th percentile.
Volatility of portfolio returns Standard deviation of the yearly portfolio returns in the year
before the investor participated in the experiment (in %)
using monthly return data.
Sharpe ratio Sharpe ratio of the portfolio performance in the year before the
investor participated in the experiment.
(Continued)
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Table A.3—Continued
Variable Measure
Survey
Expected returns on SRI The investor’s response to the statement “I expect that the
returns of socially responsible equity funds compared to
conventional equity funds are:
much lower
a bit lower
the same
a bit higher
much higher
I do not know.”
(1 much lower, . . . , 5 much higher)
Perceived risk on SRI The investor’s response to the statement “Socially responsible
equity funds are more risky than conventional equity funds.”
(1 fully disagree, . . . , 7 fully agree)
Lower expected returns on SRI Dummy variable equal to one if the investor believes that the
returns on SRI equity funds are a bit or much lower than the
returns on conventional equity funds.
Higher expected returns on SRI Dummy variable equal to one if the investor believes that the
returns on SRI equity funds are a bit or much higher than
the returns on conventional equity funds.
Lower perceived risk on SRI Dummy variable equal to one if an investor disagrees with the
statement that the risk on SRI equity funds is higher than
the risk on conventional equity funds.
Higher perceived risk on SRI Dummy variable equal to one if an investor agrees with the
statement that the risk on SRI equity funds is higher than
the risk on conventional equity funds.
Signaling The investor’s response to the statement “I often talk about
investment with others.” (1 fully disagree, . . . , 7 fully agree).
Strong signaling Dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s response to the
statement “I often talk about investment with others” (1 fully
disagree, . . . , 7 fully agree) is greater than or equal to the
median.
Investment knowledge The investor’s response to the statement “My investment
knowledge is good.” (1 fully disagree, . . . , 7 fully agree).
Perceived social impact Dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s response to the
statement “Socially responsible investment funds have a
positive influence on society” (1 fully disagree, . . . , 7 fully
agree) is greater than or equal to the median.
University degree Dummy variable equal to one if the investor reports having a
university degree.
Female Dummy variable equal to one if the investor reports being a
woman.
Age The investor’s self-reported age.
Low income Dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s reported annual
gross family income is below 60,000 euro.
Medium income Dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s reported annual
gross family income is between 60,000 euro and 100,000 euro.
High income Dummy variable equal to one if the investor’s reported annual
gross family income is above 100,000 euro.
Untold income Dummy variable equal to one if the investor does not disclose
his or her income.
Log donations Logarithm of the average yearly amount that the investor
reports donating to charity.
Incentivized experiment
Risk preferences Risk-free money amount at which the investor switches from
choosing the risky lottery to choosing the risk-free option in
the risk preferences elicitation task. A higher amount
indicates that the investor is more risk-tolerant.
(Continued)
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Table A.3—Continued
Variable Measure
Intrinsic social preferences Social preferences are measured by the second mover’s
behavior in the trust game. The second mover indicates how
much he or she wants to send back for each possible amount
that the first mover could send. To construct this variable, we
first calculate the return ratio for each possible first mover
transfer in the trust game. If the first mover sends 5 euro,
the amount the second mover returns is divided by 5; if the
first mover sends 10 euro the amount the second mover
returns is divided by 10; etc. We then calculate the average of
these ratios across the range of the 5 to 50 euro first mover
transfers. The measure varies from 0 to 3.
Strong social preferences Dummy variable that takes the value one if the investor has an
average return ratio in the trust game of 2 or higher. This
means splitting the amount of money in the experiment at
least equally. The variable takes the value of zero otherwise.
Weak social preferences Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the investor has
an average return ratio in the trust game of less than 2. This
means giving the other player less than half of the money in
the experiment. The variable takes the value of zero
otherwise.
Weak social preferences &
strong signaling
Dummy variable equal to one if the investor has both weak
social preferences and strong signaling and zero otherwise.
Table A.4
Summary Statistics and Comparison of Investors with and without
SRI Equity Funds
This table presents summary statistics for investors with and without SRI equity funds. Variable
definitions are provided in Table A.3. If not otherwise indicated in Table A.3, the statistics represent
the portfolios of investors in the month in which they participated in the experiment and the survey.
Standard deviations are in parentheses and p-values are from two-sided t-tests (a) or X² tests (b). For
highly skewed variables, we only report p-values of their logarithmic transformations. Differences
in the number of observations stem from the fact that not all participants in the experiments
answered all survey questions.
Socially Responsible Investors Conventional Investors 
(16.2%) (83.8%)
Mean Median N Mean Median N
Percentage in SRI
equity funds
23.03% 9.82% 146 – – – –
Social motives
Mean intrinsic social
preferences
1.53 1.79 146 1.41 1.51 756 0.052a
(0.66) (0.68)
Signaling 3.41 3 146 3.06 3 756 0.009a
(1.48) (1.49)
(Continued)
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Table A.4—Continued
Socially Responsible Investors Conventional Investors 
(16.2%) (83.8%)
Mean Median N Mean Median N
Financial motives
Lower expected
returns on SRI
48.89% 135 56.17% 673 0.121b
Higher expected
returns on SRI
17.04% 135 14.41% 673 0.434b
Lower perceived risk
on SRI
39.86% 138 43.02% 716 0.491b
Higher perceived
risk on SRI
18.84% 138 16.62% 716 0.525b
Portfolio
characteristics
Average holding
period
32.3 29.5 146 32.1 28 752 0.890a
(14.2) (17.0)
Total portfolio value 104,332 53,005 146 70,235 35,845 752 –
(262,880) (146,468)
Log total portfolio
value
10.70 10.86 146 10.25 10.49 752 0.002a
(1.38) (1.57)
Number of
transactions
15.5 8 138 17.2 8 605 –
(18.0) (22.0)
Log number of
transactions
2.14 2.08 138 2.04 2.08 605 0.438a
(1.14) (1.34)
Donations
Donations (in euro) 1,074 500 106 845 300 525 –
(1,300) (1,355)
Log donations 6.2 6.2 106 5.8 5.7 525 0.008a
(1.4) (1.4)
Individual
characteristics
Investment
knowledge
4.34 4 146 4.08 4 756 0.029a
(91.13) (1.38)
University degree 58.96% 134 46.67% 705 0.009b
Risk preferences 115.8 110 146 112.2 110 756 0.340a
(39.4) (40.8)
Female 12.33% 146 18.73% 753 0.064b
Age 55.45 55 144 56.83 56 751 0.166a
(11.39) (10.83)
Low income 28.36% 134 30.47% 699 0.625b
High income 20.90% 134 20.46% 699 0.909b
Untold income 17.16% 134 17.31% 699 0.967b
2540 The Journal of Finance R©
Table A.5
Exclusion of Investors Who Believe SRI Is a Marketing Trick
This table reports results of regressions equivalent to those in Table III (specifications (1) and (2))
and Table IV (specifications (3) and (4)). Here, we exclude subjects who rate the statement “I think
that socially responsible investment funds are a marketing trick with the goal to sell more funds”
(1 fully disagree, . . . , 7 fully agree) with a 4 or higher (10.6%). Specifications (1) and (3) present
marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable is SRI equity, which takes the value
of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund in the month he or she participated in the experiment
and survey and zero otherwise. Specifications (2) and (4) present coefficients of OLS regressions.
The dependent variable is % in SRI equity funds, which is equal to the investor’s holdings in SRI
equity funds as a share of his or her total investments in equity. In specifications (2) and (4) only
investors with a share greater than zero are considered. For definitions of the other variables, see
Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social motives
Social preferences 0.0802*** −0.0314
(0.0252) (0.0492)
Signaling 0.0269** −0.0168
(0.0112) (0.0159)
Strong social preferences 0.1027** −0.0881
(0.0459) (0.0720)
Weak social preferences
& strong signaling
0.0578 −0.1290**
(0.0442) (0.0637)
Financial motives
Sharpe ratio 0.0108 0.0637 0.0137 0.0574
(0.0213) (0.0546) (0.0209) (0.0559)
Lower expected returns
on SRI
−0.0561* −0.0353 −0.0545 −0.0445
(0.0335) (0.0411) (0.0340) (0.0412)
Higher expected returns
on SRI
−0.0419 −0.0103 −0.0426 −0.0215
(0.0375) (0.0633) (0.0381) (0.0618)
Lower perceived risk on
SRI
−0.0558* −0.0207 −0.0488 −0.0213
(0.0307) (0.0451) (0.0310) (0.0472)
Higher perceived risk on
SRI
0.0180 0.0653 0.0147 0.0565
(0.0473) (0.0711) (0.0478) (0.0670)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0024** −0.0007 0.0023** −0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0018)
Log total portfolio value 0.0425*** −0.0559*** 0.0407*** −0.0542***
(0.0137) (0.0202) (0.0139) (0.0194)
Log number of
transactions
0.0227* 0.0317 0.0225* 0.0230
(0.0119) (0.0241) (0.0117) (0.0225)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0027 −0.0428** 0.0089 −0.0433**
(0.0119) (0.0210) (0.0114) (0.0205)
University degree 0.0742** 0.0625 0.0699** 0.0523
(0.0327) (0.0495) (0.0331) (0.0502)
Risk preferences −0.0003 0.0013** −0.0002 0.0011**
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
(Continued)
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Table A.5—Continued
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.0082 0.0039 −0.0036 −0.0004
(0.0430) (0.0575) (0.0414) (0.0524)
Age −0.0024 0.0001 −0.0026* −0.0002
(0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0023)
Low income 0.0080 0.0357 0.0069 0.0302
(0.0379) (0.0617) (0.0384) (0.0617)
High income −0.0466 0.0448 −0.0494 0.0468
(0.0360) (0.0711) (0.0364) (0.0711)
Untold income −0.0180 −0.0583 −0.0199 −0.0507
(0.0422) (0.0482) (0.0423) (0.0452)
Constant 0.8324*** 0.8866***
(0.2977) (0.2456)
Observations 566 109 566 109
R² 0.2308 0.2512
Table A.6
Exclusion of Investors Who Failed at Least One Practice Question
in Experiment
This table reports results of regressions equivalent to those in Table III (specifications (1) and (2))
and Table IV (specifications (3) and (4)). Here, we exclude subjects who incorrectly answered at
least one of the four practice questions three consecutive times (11.3%). Specifications (1) and (3)
present marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent variable is SRI equity, which takes
the value of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund in the month he or she participated in
the experiment and survey and zero otherwise. Specifications (2) and (4) present coefficients of
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is % in SRI equity funds, which is equal to the investor’s
holdings in SRI equity funds as a share of his or her total investments in equity. In specifications
(2) and (4) only investors with a share greater than zero are considered. For definitions of the
other variables, see Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social motives
Social preferences 0.0789*** −0.0018
(0.0258) (0.0459)
Signaling 0.0235** −0.0234
(0.0118) (0.0180)
Strong social preferences 0.1151** −0.1236
(0.0465) (0.0819)
Weak social preferences
& strong signaling
0.0670 −0.2116***
(0.0478) (0.0792)
(Continued)
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Table A.6—Continued
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial motives
Sharpe ratio 0.0097 0.0680 0.0138 0.0550
(0.0224) (0.0536) (0.0217) (0.0550)
Lower expected returns
on SRI
−0.0504 −0.0634 −0.0471 −0.0595
(0.0342) (0.0516) (0.0345) (0.0458)
Higher expected returns
on SRI
−0.0305 −0.0170 −0.0299 −0.0141
(0.0414) (0.0701) (0.0420) (0.0669)
Lower perceived risk on
SRI
−0.0621* −0.0157 −0.0574* −0.0247
(0.0322) (0.0526) (0.0325) (0.0513)
Higher perceived risk on
SRI
−0.0016 0.0857 −0.0079 0.0864
(0.0471) (0.0773) (0.0467) (0.0699)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0025** −0.0004 0.0025** −0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0019)
Log total portfolio value 0.0401*** −0.0560*** 0.0380*** −0.0567***
(0.0138) (0.0208) (0.0139) (0.0199)
Log number of
transactions
0.0340*** 0.0211 0.0342*** 0.0098
(0.0123) (0.0289) (0.0121) (0.0264)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0005 −0.0414** 0.0050 −0.0479**
(0.0127) (0.0201) (0.0121) (0.0186)
University degree 0.0676** 0.0588 0.0623* 0.0449
(0.0340) (0.0593) (0.0344) (0.0564)
Risk preferences −0.0001 0.0018*** −0.0001 0.0017***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Female 0.0142 −0.0087 0.0034 −0.0189
(0.0459) (0.0622) (0.0443) (0.0558)
Age −0.0021 0.0020 −0.0024 0.0021
(0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0023)
Low income 0.0422 0.0346 0.0410 0.0210
(0.0431) (0.0626) (0.0435) (0.0624)
High income −0.0287 0.0043 −0.0301 0.0097
(0.0410) (0.0652) (0.0413) (0.0635)
Untold income −0.0029 0.0112 −0.0049 0.0304
(0.0461) (0.0674) (0.0454) (0.0622)
Constant 0.6463** 0.8127***
(0.2956) (0.2632)
Observations 555 112 555 112
R² 0.2250 0.2950
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Table A.7
Exclusion of Investors Who Expect Higher Returns on SRI and
Perceive Lower Risk, but Do Not Hold SRI Funds
This table reports results of regressions equivalent to those in Table III (specifications (1) and (2))
and Table IV (specifications (3) and (4)). Here, we exclude subjects who do not invest in SRI equity
funds but expect such funds to yield higher returns at lower risk compared to normal equity funds
(6.5%). Specifications (1) and (3) present marginal effects of probit regressions. The dependent
variable is SRI equity, which takes the value of one if an investor holds an SRI equity fund in
the month he or she participated in the experiment and survey and zero otherwise. Specifications
(2) and (4) present coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is % in SRI equity
funds, which is equal to the investor’s holdings in SRI equity funds as a share of his or her
total investments in equity. In specifications (2) and (4) only investors with a share greater than
zero are considered. For definitions of the other variables, see Table A.3. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social motives
Social preferences 0.0755*** −0.0151
(0.0253) (0.0486)
Signaling 0.0272** −0.0158
(0.0116) (0.0172)
Strong social preferences 0.1192** −0.1061
(0.0469) (0.0824)
Weak social preferences
& strong signaling
0.0747 −0.1575**
(0.0457) (0.0788)
Financial motives
Sharpe ratio −0.0002 0.0598 0.0026 0.0522
(0.0223) (0.0536) (0.0233) (0.0550)
Lower expected returns
on SRI
−0.0619* −0.0776 −0.0589* −0.0748
(0.0342) (0.0488) (0.0345) (0.0456)
Higher expected returns
on SRI
0.0687 −0.0079 0.0648 −0.0082
(0.0638) (0.0699) (0.0632) (0.0678)
Lower perceived risk on
SRI
−0.0089 −0.0039 −0.0042 −0.0102
(0.0333) (0.0513) (0.0335) (0.0512)
Higher perceived risk on
SRI
0.0043 0.0630 0.0009 0.0584
(0.0462) (0.0727) (0.0465) (0.0657)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0024** −0.0016 0.0025** −0.0022
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0019)
Log total portfolio value 0.0430*** −0.0566*** 0.0407*** −0.0560***
(0.0136) (0.0196) (0.0137) (0.0190)
Log number of
transactions
0.0262** 0.0175 0.0268** 0.0101
(0.0124) (0.0267) (0.0122) (0.0250)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge 0.0022 −0.0303 0.0081 −0.0323*
(0.0130) (0.0190) (0.0125) (0.0183)
University degree 0.0546 0.0503 0.0499 0.0440
(0.0333) (0.0545) (0.0336) (0.0537)
(Continued)
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Table A.7—Continued
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk preferences −0.0001 0.0016** −0.0001 0.0015**
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Female 0.0078 −0.0247 −0.0018 −0.0270
(0.0447) (0.0591) (0.0434) (0.0540)
Age −0.0021 0.0016 −0.0024 0.0015
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0023)
Low income 0.0168 0.0183 0.0150 0.0111
(0.0401) (0.0607) (0.0403) (0.0597)
High income −0.0200 0.0388 −0.0261 0.0440
(0.0423) (0.0650) (0.0418) (0.0647)
Untold income −0.0100 −0.0091 −0.0136 −0.0014
(0.0442) (0.0667) (0.0436) (0.0635)
Constant 0.7253** 0.8225***
(0.2927) (0.2574)
Observations 582 119 582 119
R² 0.1910 0.2317
Table A.8
Inclusion of the Full Set of Signaling Dummies
This table reports results of regressions similar to those in Table III but with the signaling variable
fully dummied out. Specification (1) presents marginal effects of a probit regression. The dependent
variable is SRI equity, which takes the value of one if the investor holds an SRI equity fund in the
month he or she participated in the experiment and survey and zero otherwise. Specification (2)
presents coefficients of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is % in SRI equity funds, which
is equal to the investor’s holdings in SRI equity funds as a share of his or her total investments
in equity. In specification (2) only investors with a share greater than zero are considered. Social
signaling dummies: dummies for the extent to which the investor agrees with the statement “I
often talk about investment with others” (1 fully disagree (base category), . . . , 7 fully agree). All
other variables are the same as in Table III. For definitions of these variables, see Table A.3. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2)
Social motives
Social preferences 0.0708*** −0.0290
(0.0234) (0.0467)
Social signaling dummy = 2 0.1608** 0.0617
(0.0681) (0.1160)
Social signaling dummy = 3 0.1630** −0.0627
(0.0796) (0.1185)
Social signaling dummy = 4 0.1575** 0.0587
(0.0791) (0.1158)
(Continued)
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Table A.8—Continued
Probit OLS
Has SRI Equity % in SRI Equity
(1) (2)
Social signaling dummy = 5 0.2011** −0.0323
(0.0912) (0.1287)
Social signaling dummy = 6 0.2435* −0.0613
(0.1337) (0.1376)
Social signaling dummy = 7 0.5851** −0.0890
(0.2538) (0.1352)
Financial motives
Sharpe ratio −0.0028 0.0546
(0.0217) (0.0567)
Lower expected returns on SRI −0.0588* −0.0871*
(0.0318) (0.0493)
Higher expected returns on SRI −0.0459 −0.0378
(0.0357) (0.0656)
Lower perceived risk on SRI −0.0427 −0.0146
(0.0299) (0.0527)
Higher perceived risk on SRI 0.0116 0.0758
(0.0440) (0.0737)
Portfolio characteristics
Average holding period 0.0023** −0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0020)
Log total portfolio value 0.0374*** −0.0643***
(0.0123) (0.0197)
Log number of transactions 0.0258** 0.0165
(0.0114) (0.0258)
Individual characteristics
Investment knowledge −0.0036 −0.0363*
(0.0119) (0.0201)
University degree 0.0585* 0.0538
(0.0312) (0.0536)
Risk preferences −0.0001 0.0015**
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Female 0.0031 −0.0267
(0.0412) (0.0578)
Age −0.0025* 0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0021)
Low income 0.0285 0.0205
(0.0388) (0.0658)
High income −0.0213 0.0339
(0.0383) (0.0654)
Untold income −0.0032 −0.0014
(0.0413) (0.0702)
Constant 0.8598***
(0.3210)
Observations 625 121
R² 0.2236
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